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I own a small, hardcover copy John Ruskin’s Modern Painters,
volume five in the Everyman’s Library Series (#212), published in 1907.
“Own,” however, is not quite the right word. I don’t remember how it came
into my possession, but there’s a good chance that I picked it up from a
box of free books discarded by Louis MacKendrick when he retired as
professor of English Literature from the University of Windsor in 2002.
While this gap, this little amnesia, is irresolvable, it has opened up other
mnemonic tangents, as I’ll explain below. 
Recently, I went looking for the book because I wanted to consult
Ruskin’s preface, where he apologizes for “the length of time occupied in
the preparation of this volume” and admits how “vexatious” this has been
for him. Over the past three years, as The Making of Memory ran into
unforeseeable delays on its way to press, I’ve had much the same
feeling. 
The Making of Memory started out as a Distinguished Speakers
Series for the Humanities Research Group (HRG), running from
September 2002 to April 2003. There were four speakers in the series, a
combination of academics and medical professionals, one of whom was
also a novelist. The three essays on this website belong to Jeffrey Olick,
a professor of sociology at the University of Virginia; Roxanne Rimstead,
Département des Lettres et Communications Université de Sherbrooke;
and Morris Moscovitch, who holds a Chair in Neuropsychology and
Cognitive Science at the University of Toronto. Aryeh Lev Stollman, who
appeared as one of the more popular HRG Speakers at the time (his
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father Samuel Stollman had been a greatly respected English
Renaissance specialist at the university before retiring some time ago),
does not appear on the site. However, he is an acclaimed novelist and a
neuroradiologist at New York City’s Mount Sinai Medical Center. 
By the late autumn of 2003, three of the four papers had been
submitted and the Speakers Series inched closer to publication. But then
the editing process stalled and went on stalling for a full year. When
Kathleen McCrone succeeded me in my post as interim director of the
HRG in summer 2004, she suggested publishing the whole thing
electronically. Thanks to the internet, The Making of Memory is now
universally and instantaneously available, and this gratifies all of us,
especially the contributors whose patience has been rewarded.
I
 “Memory and the Brain,” by Moscovitch, is concerned with organic
amnesia, a condition whose causes are found in neurological
impairments such as tumors, strokes, and infections, or in diseases such
as Alzheimer’s. The essay takes us into a specialized world of brain
exploration where new empirical findings fill in sections of a larger and
often daunting puzzle. The brain has its own inner reasons, which our
current stock of scientific reasoning is not yet capable of discerning. Yet
one soon realizes that the experimental method accrues its knowledge,
and its faith, through a dogged research agenda whose achievements
are a provisional blend of fact and speculation. Those of us who rarely
consult books and journals on neuroscience and psychology will discover
that our popular conceptions of amnesia are deplorably naïve. Others, for
whom images of amnesia in the popular culture point beyond their
inherent triviality or uses in melodrama, will find much that is suggestive
in the essay.
Moscovitch underscores the selective nature of organic amnesia
and, in his closing sections, draws out some implications for our
understanding of normal, unimpaired memory functions. If properly
gleaned, his essay opens a window onto the philosophy and what one
might call the poetics of human consciousness. This poetics has
absorbed many of the now-canonical figures of the modern era. I think of
novelists, poets, psychologists, and philosophers, each addressing
themselves to the neurosophy of consciousness. In coining this term, I
want readers to think of Freud and Proust when they explored the
question of memory and its relationship to that chimerical domain that we
call the past.
As a non-specialist, I am intrigued by the distinction that Moscovitch
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and others have drawn between episodic and semantic memory, and the
primary role accorded to memory in structuring and sustaining the
operations of consciousness. There has been much debate in recent
decades over the purpose of consciousness. To what degree is it
necessary as an evolutionary trait? To what extent is it an
epiphenomenon when so much of our physiological functioning, including
the processing of sensory data and the maintenance of psychological
equilibrium, operates subconsciously with no reflectiveness or manifest
intentionality on our part? Moscovitch does not tackle these issues, but
he does tantalize us when he declares that “’consciousness’ is . . . part of
the memory trace” and that “memory appears to have some temporal and
thematic organization” independently of our conscious disposition of its
contents.
It was the Moscovitch lecture during the series, and then the paper
itself, that first got me thinking about Ruskin. It stirred up thoughts of Ian
Hacking (whom Moscovitch quotes) and Proust (whom he does not). Put
simply, what most of us in the humanities find intriguing in the clinical
study of memory is that medical science now ranges ever deeper into an
exploration of those powers and properties that were once said to belong
to the soul, and which Freud, in turn, reduced to the embodied psyche.
This is one of Hacking's great insights. Moscovitch's discussion of
mnemonic impairments is highly technical, and makes no mention of the
soul or of À la recherche du temps perdu. But his paper does not
preclude a drift in that latter, Proustian (and neurosophical) direction.
It becomes apparent that our identities in time are conditioned by the
emotional states associated with memory acts, as well as the emotional
residues of forgotten mental data. And, in addition, that our memory acts
include conscious retrievals, involuntary retrievals, and unconscious
blockages for which the brain provides detours. “Unconscious blockages”
points us toward psychoanalysis, but none of this need be Freudian
(Proust is enough, as I’ll illustrate in a moment). Normal memory, as
Moscovitch terms it, functions without impairments but can still encounter
blockages that hide mnemonic data. That much is obvious to most of us,
even without an open reliance on metaphor, but metaphors, like
narratives, are indispensable even when we convince ourselves that their
real worth lies in their self-subversiveness.
Here, therefore, is a scenario, occasioned by listening to Moscovitch
and reading his paper: perhaps the experience of organic amnesia is like
encountering a blank or a black hole in the mnemonic field of vision; the
field remains intact, but parts of it cannot be mnemonically--that is,
visually--negotiated. We can never have full consciousness of the whole
mnemonic field, but organic amnesia creates a great deal of localized
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dissonance that manifests itself as operational impairment in present-
tense consciousness. Meanwhile, much like present-tense
consciousness, which it underpins, normal, unimpaired memory is like a
full spectrum field, but it cannot simply be seen in its totality, in one
sweep. Its underlying organization and even some of its chief landmarks
will often remain invisible or blocked off unless consciousness is
stimulated to embark on a traversal.
               This brings us back to Ruskin. After I went looking for it, the most memorable
thing about that handy little Everyman’s volume, aside from Ruskin’s
prose and the images (which begin with an Ancilla Domini frontispiece by
Fra Angelico and continue with all kinds of illustrations, many from
Ruskin’s own hand), was MacKendrick’s signature on the first page past
the cover. It appears in the upper right corner, in a blue script that shows
where hand pressure and ink flow thickened or thinned as “Kim” (his
nickname) laid in his cursive autograph.
My surprise at finding MacKendrick’s signature, when I least
expected it and had in fact forgotten it or never noticed it before, is what
made it a memory portal. It was a window that sprang up with unexpected
swiftness, like a computer screen that pops back from dormancy at the
slightest nudge of the mouse. The signature sent me back to my first
days as a university student. Back a quarter century, to a time when
MacKendrick’s handwriting filled out the margins and end pages of my
essays and test papers, back when I was an undergraduate in his British
literature class, when he would squeak excitedly about Georgian poets,
Conrad’s Youth, and Shaw’s drolleries in his Caesar and Cleopatra play. I
still remember the imprint of his voice, which hopped about the mote-filled
sunlight of Dillon Hall just as much as he did.
 I cannot, of course, remember many of MacKendrick’s exact
utterances, but the signature did touch off flash-bulb moments of
perceptual consciousness. This is not merely another metaphor, or if it is,
it speaks to a string of mnemonic snapshots that engrosses me at
different sensory levels at one and the same instant. I seem to feel again
the embodiment of that time and place, which comes in on me as
a combination of Mackendrick’s voice, his jaunty, exuberant energy-
bursts, and bits and pieces of his exegeses and exclamations. The
broader circumstances of a lecture, the wider settings of a given day, are
unimportant from the standpoint of such memory-moments. What matters
is the awakening of those sensory echoes that consciousness seems to
have folded away forever. These echoes ‘awaken’ and flash out like a
glare from shook foil, and then fall away again into a deeper and perhaps
more terminal dormancy, acting like Shelley’s fading coal of the
imagination.  
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This process of receiving and processing information, then promptly
forgetting it, and then discovering that it was there inside me all along,
was surely Proustian. A petite madeleine moment. In telling such a story,
I am only underlining what the Moscovitch essay might conjure for
readers from the humanities side of the intellectual spectrum. We learn
that the brain is a layered, invaginated engine that digitizes, labels,
stores, retrieves, revises, or purges information under conditions that are
still quite inaccessible to us. And we conclude, rather humbly and
bookishly, that nothing gets done without tropes and stories.
Even so, most of our sciences, whether hard or soft, are still clumsy
and descriptive, while memory, like the soul that it superseded, keeps
surprising us from the depths of its gravitas. It wafts up like a scent, it
steers our inner eye back in the direction of its distant music; or it simply
bursts into consciousness from neurological hiding places that are far too
many and far too puzzling to understand without the help of metaphor. An
ambush worth wondering at.
II
The detailed clinical overview presented by Moscovitch is offset by
the other two papers on this website, which range across customary
terrain in the humanities and social sciences. These are Rimstead’s
“Remembering the Unemployed: Counter-Memory and Cultural
Resistance” and Olick’s “Collective Memory and Chronic Differentiation:
Historicity and the Public Sphere.”
Rimstead argues for a transvaluation of Canada’s memory
narratives, with a focus on the iconography of poverty and joblessness.
She asks why, in the moral economy of a nation’s memory, the ordeals of
the unemployed and the impoverished are largely neglected; or why,
when they live on at all, must it be in the dust-bowl and bread-line
imagery from the 1930s. Her response is to offer a sustained analytic of
the iconography governing poverty and joblessness, as handed down
from that earlier era. The concept of class is, to be sure, the invariable
touchstone for all of Rimstead’s counter-hegemonic arguments.
If we stop to ponder urban settlement patterns (blacks relegated to
the north end of Halifax; Slavs, Italians, and Jews clustering around Ford
City in Windsor), the history of labour unions, and the cross-country
trekking of the hoboes and unemployed ‘idlers’ that Rimstead writes
about, it is difficult to abstain from reckoning with class as the ultimate
measure of social justice and injustice in our society, and the place this
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question must hold in the nation’s collective memory. Implying a contrast
with his own eschatological role, Jesus of Nazareth once supposedly told
his apostles that the poor would always be a demographic reality and that
alleviating their plight would have to be part of the Christian mission after
he was gone.
But in the era after Marx, the academic conscience is self-
consciously secular. It is concerned with institutional mechanisms and
ideological inclusions and exclusions. With her tacit reliance on the
category of class, Rimstead helps some of us detect telling parallels
between narratives, iconographies, and urban realities. The poor and the
unemployed have long been relegated to a position of almost
irrecoverable marginality in Canadian collective memory, just as workers
and low-wage immigrants have often been exiled and economically
quarantined in particular neighbourhoods and city sectors.
Following on Rimstead’s line of reasoning, I would, however,
propose a different emphasis. We need to grapple with factors that are
statistically more elusive yet more culturally formative than the economic
identiterianism embedded in the Marxist conception of class. I am well
aware that social scientists today apply this term  “class” beyond the
combative definitions laid down by Marx, but it is also true that in using
the term one remains hard pressed to escape his determinations: for
example, the concrete act of manual and mechanical labour, a labourer’s
actual position in the apparatus of capitalist production, and then beyond
the individual labourer, his or her collective ‘social’ (the preferred Marxian
term) identity as defined by a dependency on wage-work, that is, the
freedom that labourers have to capitalize on their skills by selling
themselves in the labour market.
My argument is that this empirically-grounded discourse of class
must be supplemented and indeed surmounted by an analytic that takes
account of other social and cultural factors. I’m thinking of identity
practices that crystallize around such things as ethnic, racial, or religious
values and traditions; that maintain fealty to homelands, real or
imaginary; and that invest, ideologically and psychologically, in memories
and myths of the past and projections into the future. This whole complex
of social and cultural factors is articulated alongside class and is not,
therefore, determinate in itself. But the practical and axiological efficacy
of such factors (for example, their institutional forms, their folkways, their
ideals and tables of value) is indisputably resilient, often binding the
collective into formations that an appeal to class all on its own could not
sustain. Such factors, I am suggesting, have a reach that is at once
deeper and higher, and in some sense more rarefied and yet more
thoroughly anthropological than that which is provided by the Marxian
model.
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To understand this we need to examine two glib clichés, only
recently outmoded, describing Canada as a multi-ethnic "mosaic" and the
United States as a "melting pot." These were taught to us in elementary
school, often contrastively, and must be considered as important
ideological indicators in any analysis of collective identity and its
relationship to the collective-memory erasures of which Rimstead speaks.
The terms “mosaic” and “melting pot” tell me that the various
constituencies that make up Western multicultural societies will, by
definition, focus their loyalties and therefore their memories on nation or
ethnicity rather than class. Identity categories grounded in such loyalties
have a deeper cultural reach than affiliations derived from the class
system of Euro-American capitalism. In fact, the ontological priority of
racial, national, or ethnic identity is written right across the many
upheavals that define modernity in the past two centuries. Today, it is
most readily observable in the moral priority accorded to collective
suffering.
Once upon a time, and not too long ago, monuments to soldiers and
statesmen centred our memories on the political or military triumphs of
the nation state. If nations are and were, in large part, imagined
communities and ideological constructs, so too was the old Soviet bloc. It
put itself in the vanguard of a global revolutionary movement and studded
public spaces with statues of Lenin and monuments to nameless,
proletarian heroes. East and West mirrored each other in at least in this
way, thus foregrounding the obvious: Marxism was a political theology
that emerged from a Western matrix. Its programmatic universalism and
its later, international mutations remind us of this parentage whenever
tensions or contradictions arose in its would-be collaboration with local
political interests and older identity infrastructures. 
Already, during the high tide of the Cold War, we could see that
many symbols and stories dedicated to the glory of the nation state (or
the communist superstate) were being transvalued in the name of those
groups that were chewed up by the march of Western modernity. This
term ‘modernity’ names a multilayered phenomenon that includes the
triumphs of national state, the whole sordid history of colonization and
decolonization, and the numerous communist, Marxist, and fascist
projects that swept the across the world for much of the twentieth
century.
Since the end of the Second World War it appears that the heroes of
collective memory have emerged from the ranks of the victims. Voices
speak up, texts are rewritten, documentaries are aired, legislation is
passed, all in memory of those that have endured genocide, slavery,
colonial oppression, totalitarian systems, and other insidious or openly
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intolerant forms of majority rule. All the major socio-political movements
of the last hundred or so years have made it a virtue to instrumentalize
these voices in their struggles against each other.
Because of all this, and because Canada is the world’s proudest
diasporic “mosaic,” it is all the more surprising that the sufferings of the
poor and unemployed among us have been minimized. Rimstead’s essay
thus alerts us to a major blind spot in the commemorative agenda of the
developed world more generally. But there are reasons for this blindness,
and these need not be seen through a conspiratorial lens. The
unemployed and the poor constitute, at best, a subclass within the
working class, and as such enjoy a markedly lower victim profile in public
discourse where class fails to hold the general attention when set against
other identity classifications that can appeal to a richer historical layering
in group experiences. It is on this point that Marx, with his acute and
convincing analysis of an earlier stage of industrial capitalism, may have
ideologically misdirected our understanding of the socio-economic
dynamics of modernity.
Put simply, ‘class’ has proved surprisingly unviable as an identity
category within the developed nation state and proves even weaker when
asked to cross international borders. The same, however, is clearly not
true of ethnic, racial, and religious affiliations. Over the past few decades
we have seen that these loyalties refuse to die out for the sake of
international class solidarity, and are in fact enjoying a resurgence. Those
same modern economic forces that contracted time and space, and
overleapt so many political boundaries, did not, in the end, create a
revolutionary class identity rooted in the consciousness of transnational
oppression.
Instead, the epic of capitalism has stimulated economic migrations
across the globe. These flows have been in the direction of industrially
developed states where the migrants find themselves living among a
majority that may or may not be sympathetic to their ‘otherness’, despite
the ideology of tolerance that has been legislated throughout the Euro-
American domains. In such situations, groups maintain their cohesion
and individuals alleviate themselves of a very palpable sense of
dislocation and difference by holding firmly to memories of the homeland
and reaffirming deep-seated myths of identity and origin.
Since the 1960s, Euro-American societies have struggled to redefine
the nature of the social contract. They have sought to purge themselves
of glaring contradictions and inequalities inherent in their democracies
and their capitalist ways of life. This undertaking is inherently and, some
would argue, uniquely Western, born of multiple conditions: the rationalist
legacy of the Enlightenment; the riches amassed in the colonial and
imperialist eras (including slavery in the Americas); the secularization of
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the Christian ethical heritage (Alasdair MacIntyre’s disagreements
notwithstanding); the compulsive consumerist ethos of capitalist markets;
and, finally, the decline of the national (that is, the ethnic) state.
The West has been built from such conditions and its ideological
conscience has been formed accordingly. Throughout it all, the societies
of Europe and North America have made headway in re-engineering
themselves and yet ended up embodying a paradox. This paradox is
either a mark of their enduring good health or a symbolic token of their
eventual collapse. Simply put: Western values are universalized; that is,
the essential test of these values is their universal applicability; and yet,
at the same time, the logical ‘pull’ of these values disrupts and perhaps
even contradicts universalism. Why? Because everything rests--in theory-
-on the sacrosanct rights of the individual, his/her rights to life, liberty,
property, and security of person. 
The logic of multiculturalism in the West is dependent on a
related paradox, one that lifts the paradox of universalized individualism
to a collective level. Multiculturalism is premised on the historical unity
and identity of the group, not the sub-social self-integrity of the individual.
Yet this collective, this identity group, is not unlike the capitalist
corporation and the status it enjoys in law--it is treated, legally, like an
individual, and its field of operations is therefore always potentially global,
and not necessarily restricted to the home nation. It is only under the
umbrella of universalism that an identity unit gets slotted under the
heading of ‘multiculturalism’ and enjoys full lateral equality in the social
domain. But what happens when a multicultural unit, like a free individual,
insists on an internal, defining set of differences that are dissident to the
universal system which is premised on recognizing the right to
difference?
We can now begin to grasp how it is that European and North
American societies re-engineered themselves into a paradox that, on one
level at least, is characterized by the policy of multiculturalism. The
values that define the West, and whose test lies in their universalization
(by which we mean the universalization of the West itself), are roughly as
follows: individualism, secularism, the social contract, scientific inquiry
and sceptical reason, and free markets. And yet the practices that attend
on these values are--as Marx noted and indeed welcomed--less than
effective in guaranteeing the coherence and propagation of an organic or
a ‘universal’ community. On the contrary, such values and practices tend
to catalyze internal social differences based on the supreme fiction of
homo economicus, the self-possessing economic individual, the capitalist
subject. These universal values bestride the globe and underwrite
personal liberty, which is apparently the test of everything, yet one could
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plow up a field of incongruities between these two ideological poles of the
Western ideal. 
As a century-long cycle of European immigration began to wane in
the 1960s, and new immigrants from the Caribbean, Africa, the Middle
East, and South Asia began to arrive in larger numbers throughout the
1980s, Western societies were embroiled in their own socio-political
turmoils: Civil Rights, the May 1968 student and worker uprisings, the
growth of feminism and gender politics (including sexual orientation), the
rise of environmentalism and green politics, the divisiveness over
Vietnam and America’s actions in the world, and so on. Today we are
seeing the results of the strife-ridden interplay of such dominant, residual,
and emergent social tendencies in the multicultural West.
The new non-European wave of immigrants emerged from different
and often more traditional social constellations than the new, post-1960s
West was accustomed to. They came in carrying different social values,
different practices in the area of gender relations, and different
interpretations of the role that religion can and cannot play in the legal
mechanisms and the daily life of a secular state. They had been attracted
by Western wealth, security, and social mobility. But they were also the
products of decolonization and often the victims of their own elites who
collaborated with the depredations of global capitalism. As minorities in
societies where multicultural tolerance was sacred writ, they naturally
affirmed themselves through diasporic pride and self-empowerment.
But when things go wrong, globally and locally, as seems to happen
in the age of sub-state ‘terror’ that has survived the end of the Cold War,
identity becomes a formula for cultural and political insurgency. A sense
of collective grievance can bubble up quickly and furiously through the
old identity strata that underly class or the Western dogma of secular
citizenship. As has happened before, most notably in Europe’s fascist
phase, this pre-modern paradigm of identity (need we remind ourselves
that identity is always an oppositional construct?) lends itself to
extremism. It affirms itself by resisting, opposing, and perhaps finally
calling for the destruction of “the West,” “capitalism,” or merely “America.”
III
 
The high points of collective memory scholarship of the last twenty-
five years are impressively surveyed in Olick’s essay. He walks us
through a roster of significant names and arguments: Maurice
Halbwachs, Eric Hobsbawm, Reinhardt Koselleck, Jacques Le Goff,
Pierre Nora, and a handful of others. From each instance, Olick extracts
the rudiments of an assessment of how pluralistic, Western societies
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have come to cope with the discovery that the history of the nation state
has lost its providential telos. Hegel suffers a setback. History can no
longer be construed as the immanent unfolding of a national spirit. The
“state of our contemporary public sphere” is one “where absolutism (often
in the form of religious or political fundamentalism), old fashioned
liberalism, and multiculturalism mix it up side by side.”
The nation has been depleted of much of its salience as new social
pressures have exploded from within and without. Global economic
trends and communication networks have perforce contributed to the
formulation of a new conception of the state. Immigration from the
‘developing’ world is an indicator of the realignment of the world and,
more importantly, the old, national state. Such a state could, at one time,
appeal to ethnic self-consistency and could in turn rely on a
homogeneous sense of memory. All this might have been an ideological
delusion based on majority rule, but it was still perceived as real. Not so
anymore.
Today, many memories proliferate as different social sectors feel
free to recover their ‘roots’. One witnesses, at all levels, a steady parade
of commemorations and declarations of heritage. The intellectual classes
are far from immune to this general sea change. Those that are detached
from advocating for particular, grass-roots causes tend to perform
autopsies on modernity. They find that the same forces that have
continued to shape complex, fast-moving societies have also shattered
unitary notions of historical purpose. Once again, such a sense of
purpose was formerly regulated by the institutions of the nation state and
the pedagogical projection of memory in the name of the collective. But
things are different now in what we call the postmodern era. Historicism,
whether enforced by the teaching institutions of the modern state or
theorized by members of the intellectual classes, has splintered into what
Olick--with a pun fully intended--calls “chronic differentiation.”  Time and
the problematics of collective memory thus move to the forefront. The
broken pieces of that unitary monument known as history or historicisms
are picked up and reassembled--in different contexts and often for very
particular purposes. This happens, as I’ve just mentioned, in the ardent
drive to reconstruct local and regional memories or preserve oral
histories. Meanwhile, there is a more ambitious scramble for empire
being played out among the higher-echelon scholarly elites and public
intellectuals. They are busy sorting out the dynamics of national and
international affairs, and deciding what to do about the uses and abuses
of history that emerge with the construction of these new memory
narratives.
The movement of history was once said to vindicate a nation’s
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substance or testify to the ideological plenitude of a Judaeo-Christian
civilization that had progressed toward humanism and secularism. But
this type of triumphalist thinking has recently fallen into disfavour and is
being resisted in many quarters, particularly in the wake of 9/11 and the
ensuing ‘war on terror.’ Progressivist models of history and human
emancipation, born in the eighteenth century and reinscribed during the
imperial scramble for territories and resources in Africa, Asia, and the
Americas, have come in for a great deal of intellectual scepticism.
Whether this scepticism rests on convincing arguments or not, it is not
only the result of an intellectual impasse where thinkers and historians
from the left or right fight for ascendancy. There is something else at work
that co-determines prevailing intellectual tendencies.
 It is becoming more and more apparent that the historical mission of
the West and the universal applicability of its values are either being
openly contested or subject to radical ideological interpretations that have
everything to do with the chaotic birth pangs of the global system. The
centre has not been able to hold, thanks to the very modernity that the
West unleashed on itself and the world as a whole. Evidence is
everywhere and most patently in the public sphere where theories of
statecraft and the legislation of ethics are paramount concerns. American
ambitions for a unipolar order run up against multiple challenges or
challengers--China, Iran, and Chavez. Western hubris, in other words,
meets its defiant others. Then there’s pull toward “absolutism,” to borrow
Olick’s term: how does one reply to the mix of militancy and democratic
opportunism in places where Sharia-based Islamic constitutionalism is
set to dominate? How does a sanctimonious Western pluralist respond to
religious apartheid, to female genital mutilation, to the seemingly
unimpedable growth of the national security state in his own midst?
The list of such questions could go on. Within western Europe and
North America, where stable states have been long entrenched, there are
other problems that tear at the social fabric. The fragmentation of
markets, the steady onslaught of technologies that dominate modern
experience, the decline of birthrates and the increase in immigration, and
numerous other factors have shattered a belief in homogenous history.
Olick engages all this from the theoretical high ground of academic
sociology. He concludes, as we all do, that with the exception, perhaps,
of America, Western nation states no longer move forward heroically
through time. But after Vietnam, and now Iraq, there has also been a
bucket of cold water thrown in Uncle Sam’s face. The idea that
Westerners may yet find their way back to the nation, and that time and
history might resume their accustomed course, is all but defunct. 
Olick and those intellectual luminaries that he cites make it clear that
the modern Western state is no longer in solid, ideological possession of
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its memory narratives. How could it expect to be, given the dynamic
nature of those developments in commerce and technology that first
made such states possible? Capitalist dynamism, as Marx duly taught us,
undermines the communitarian pieties handed down from the past. What
we have today, therefore, are many competing pasts. Different chronic
frames proliferate in different social sectors and there is an
accompanying explosion of memory practices, all of which, in one way or
another, attempt to institute some usable sense of collective meaning.
Such is the core of Olick’s argument as he drives his discussion onward,
past the ruins of the nation. So the question becomes where are we now?
Is there a ‘we’ after the nation?
One way to answer these questions is to take a responsible
accounting of where ‘we’ have been and how this has lead to the
tensions and transitions between memory and history. This is not the
place to undertake such an accounting, but one thing is clear: collective
memory today is marked by its originating conditions--the disappearance
of the historical project of the Western nation state, for which the fate of
the two Germanies (Wilhelmine and Nazi) are the great historical
signposts. This disappearance, needless to say, is felt as a crisis, if only
on account of the promise that the nation state seemed to hold out during
its heyday in the nineteenth century. Bolshevism and Nazism changed all
that (with class politics and ethnic essentialism suffering collateral
damage). But so too did the relentless modernity of the democratic West,
which tore apart the national fabric of those same societies that must laud
themselves for resisting and finally destroying the Nazi and the
communist monsters. 
